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FOREWORD
NEAL DEVINS*

Sofia, Bulgaria-to put it mildly-seems an odd point of departure for this
symposium on elected branch constitutional decisionmaking. But it was in Sofia
that the idea for this project took hold. Let me explain. Through the auspices
of the American Bar Association, I visited Sofia as part of an ABA effort to
assist fledgling democracies in the crafting of their constitutions and other laws.
To my great surprise, the principal message I conveyed had very little to do with
the substance of the Bulgarian Constitution; instead, I told these constitution
writers that they should worry less about how well crafted their text was and
worry more about the political institutions that will help drive the agenda and
content of constitutional decisionmaking. That I gravitated toward this message
helped focus my thinking about the role of elected branch influences in the study
of U.S. constitutional decisionmaking. Indeed, the genesis for this project was
the realization that I spent as much time talking about elected branch interpretation to Bulgarian officials in just a few days as I typically spend on this subject
with my first year law students.
The proposition that the elected branches are active participants in the
shaping of constitutional values is hardly novel. One-hundred years ago, James
Bradley Thayer wrote of Congress's role in interpreting the Constitution.1 In
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1921, Justice Cardozo reminded us that the "great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by."2
Today, although the constitutional law course remains case-centered, a a growing
number of legal academics and political scientists are examining the propriety,
4
quality, and influence of elected branch interpretations.
Congress, the White House, government agencies, and the states all play
critical interdependent roles in interpreting Supreme Court decisions and the
Constitution itself. The sweep and influence of these interpretations are broad
and pervasive. Before a case comes to Court, Congress or the states must enact
a law or the executive branch must promulgate a regulation. Once a case is in
Court, the states, the Justice Department, and congressional coalitions-sometimes as parties and sometimes as amici-inform the judiciary of their views.
Through the appointments-confirmation process, moreover, the president and
Senate control the composition of the federal bench. After a case is adjudicated,
elected government may seek to expand or limit the holding through a number
of techniques ranging from the interpretation of the judicial ruling to the
nullification of the ruling through constitutional amendment.
Most landmark Supreme Court decisions cannot be understood without
paying attention to the politics surrounding them. First, Justices pay attention
to politics in crafting their decisions. John Marshall's sequencing of merits and
jurisdiction in Marbury v. Madison5 and Earl Warren's efforts at crafting a
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education6 were both preemptive

strikes designed to limit the political repercussions of unpopular decisions.
Second, politics is informative in assessing Supreme Court doctrine. Legislation
limiting the impact of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority7
speaks to whether states' rights concerns are adequately represented in
Congress. Analysis of the decision to defer to military decisionmaking in
Korematsu v. United States should take into account that the internment of
Japanese-Americans was a subterfuge perpetuated by the military and approved
by the Justice Department.' Third, political judgments shape Court doctrine.
Congress's choice to ground the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act in the Commerce Clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment
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allowed the Court to treat Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States1" and
Katzenbach v. McClung11 as commerce cases.1 2 Similarly, amendments to the
1987 Ethics in Government Act proved critical to Morrison v. Olson by
expanding Justice Department authority in independent counsel investigations.1 3
Fourth, politics contributes to the ultimate meaning of Court action. The
institutional dynamics that made the legislative veto so popular before I.N.S. v.
4 explain why the device continues to be used, with well over two
Chadha"
hundred legislative vetoes put into place in the past decade."i The limits of
Brown J'sJ6 delegation of remedial authority to southern district court judges
are underscored by mid-1960s elected branch action which resulted in more
desegregation in 1965 than in the decade following Brown.17 And, fifth, once
the Supreme Court has decided a case, a "constitutional dialogue" takes place
between the Court and elected government, often resulting in a decision more
to the liking of political actors. Congress ultimately persevered in challenging
the Court's 1918 rejection of the Commerce Clause as the basis for child labor
legislation." Executive and legislative action to express disapproval of Roe v.
Wade19 through funding restrictions was approved by the Court in both Harris
v. McRae2° and Rust v. Sullivan.2 1
The articles contained in this volume reinforce the above propositions and
offer several additional insights to the appropriateness and impact of elected
branch interpretations. Contributors to this symposium explore this topic either
by exploring the workings of an institutional actor across a range of issues or by
examining a single topic in some detail. At the same time, all of the contributors
are attentive to both institutional and topical concerns. Questions considered in
this volume include whether elected branch fact finding can address individual
rights concerns more comprehensively than judicial fact finding can; whether and
when the elected branches take seriously their responsibility to interpret the
Constitution; how the structure and procedures of the executive and legislative
branches affect elected branch interpretation; whether the judiciary gives due
regard to elected branch attitudes and interpretations; and, finally, how the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches should share the task of constitutional
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interpretation. The balance of this foreword will provide a snapshot of how the
contributors to this volume address these issues.
Elected Branch Fact Finding and Individual Rights. Differences between
elected branch and judicial fact finding play a prominent role in several articles.
My contribution on the Reagan Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC")
battles with Congress over the fairness doctrine and diversity preferences calls
attention to the critical role that elected branch fact finding plays in the
resolution of constitutional disputes.22 The Reagan FCC claimed that fairness
and diversity preferences inhibited broadcast diversity and were therefore
unconstitutional; Congress reached the opposite conclusion. The resolution of
both issues ultimately hinged on whether the courts would view congressional or
FCC fact finding as controlling governmental policy. John Garvey's contribution
on the flap surrounding the National Endowment of the Arts' ("NEA") funding
of Robert Mapplethorpe and others calls attention to Congress's ability to
respond constructively to equality concerns in its resolution of a First Amendment issue.'

Specifically, by requiring the Endowment to "respect ... the

diverse beliefs and values of the American public,"'24 Garvey suggests that
legislative fact finding-by viewing the Religious Right as a minority in need of
protection-may prove more far-ranging than judicial fact finding.'
Congress's ability (if not propensity) to craft statutes that provide greater
protections for individual rights by taking into account facts that courts might not
otherwise consider lays at the heart of Kathy Abrams's contribution on gender
and sexual orientation in the military26 and Peter Shane's article on voting
rights.27 Kathy Abrams argues that the military's exclusionary policies are a byproduct of androcentrism, namely, the military's desire "to preserve combat
effectiveness in a force that leaders had always (if not always correctly)
conceived of as consisting exclusively of straight male soldiers."' To combat
this androcentrism, Abrams proposes a combination of judicial and elected
branch influences. Judicial influences provide focus and publicity, if not countermajoritarian victories; legislative oversight of the military, although hampered by
the close working relationship between committee members and military
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personnel, allows for an examination of systematic problems. Peter Shane's
treatment of voting rights legislation casts Congress as constitution maker
through its role in creating "the system of laws, customs, and conventions that
define most fundamentally for the nation what are its organs of government, and
their relationship to one another and to the people."'29 In Shane's view, statutes
may be "genuinely constitutional" if they transform public mores and the "thencurrent legal regime."'
For Shane, voting rights legislation is part of this
statutory constitution with Congress, through its skills as fact finder, engaging in
"the sort of balancing that the Court itself customarily undertakes" and reaching
judgments contrary to the Court's along the way.31 Indeed, as Shane rightly
observes, modem voting rights legislation has had a far more profound effect on
"the content of our fundamental law" than the TWenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments.
The Seriousness of Elected Branch Interpretation. The question of whether

and when the elected branches take seriously their authority to interpret the
Constitution is discussed by nearly all of the contributors. Sometimes this
discussion is simply the backdrop to another concern. The principal purpose of
Shane's discussion of 1982 voting rights legislation, for example, is to advance his
statutory constitution argument. That this discussion also speaks to the
seriousness of legislative deliberations is, at best, an ancillary objective.
Likewise, Kathy Abrams's observation about the possible identity of interests
between the military establishment and their oversight committees is only
incidentally concerned with the seriousness of elected branch interpretation.
Stephen Wermiel, Jeremy Rabkin, John McGinnis, and Louis Fisher follow
a similar pattern. Stephen Wermiel's primary concern is to assess what influence,
if any, Senate confirmation hearings have on judicial behavior. 32 In examining
this question, Wermiel makes clear that the senators themselves must care about
constitutional interpretation if they hope to affect the judicial philosophy of
prospective nominees. Jeremy Rabkin's evaluation of the White House Counsel
calls attention to the need to have a lawyer unencumbered by the bureaucratic
demands of the Justice Department providing the president with advice on
constitutional matters. 33 That this advice may well differ from Justice Department pronouncements provides a revealing look into the deliberateness of White
House constitutional interpretation. John McGinnis's assessment of whether the
three branches engage in an implicit bargain to sort out who shall have principal
authority to define foreign relations, individual rights, and other issues also

29. Shane, supra note 27, at 243.
30. Id. at 252.
31. Id. at 261.
32. Stephen Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 56
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Policy, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Autumn 1993).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 56: No. 4

provides useful insights on the seriousness of elected branch interpretation. 4
The willingness of one branch to cede an interpretive role on one issue so that
another issue remains within its control speaks volumes to the seriousness of
both elected branch and court interpretations. Louis Fisher's revelatory
accounting of how the legislative veto persists in the face of Chadha makes clear
that the Court's legislative veto decision is little more than a throw weight that
inevitably gives way to the tugs and pulls of political necessity.35 While the
seriousness of elected branch interpretation is not the focus of this accounting,
Fisher's case study sheds light on the precedential effect of Supreme Court
decisions on elected branch action.
The seriousness of elected branch interpretation plays a more prominent role
in John Garvey's study of NEA funding and my study of FCC-congressional
relations. Garvey concludes that Congress took First Amendment values
seriously while crafting a legislative compromise principally rooted in equality
concerns. Pointing to Congress's rejection of a draconian funding ban of
"indecent materials ... which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents
of a particular religion,"36 Garvey emphasizes that Congress's real concern was
the impropriety of content controls since the people targeted by this prohibition,
"pornographers, blasphemers, bigots, had few patrons in Congress. '""
My
contribution provides a less sanguine look at elected branch interpretation.
Diversity preferences and especially the fairness doctrine portray House and
Senate committees as concerned only with policy outcomes. The article also
reveals that the FCC would rather provide a weak defense of disfavored policies
than forthrightly call into question the constitutionality of these programs. For
both the FCC and the Congress, political strategy mattered much more than
constitutional deliberations.
The Structure and Procedures of Elected Government. The manner and
degree of elected branch influences is largely a function of bureaucratic divisions
of responsibility within the executive branch and Congress as well as procedures
governing elected branch activity. Stephen Wermiel's examination of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Jeremy Rabkin's study of the White House Counsel, and
Roger Davidson's assessment of the role of congressional procedure all speak to
this phenomenon. Stephen Wermiel's suggestion that, in the wake of the Bork
nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee seeks to indirectly influence a
nominee's constitutional decisionmaking calls attention to the wide open nature
of the Senate's advice and consent function.38 Committee members may
examine a nominee's judicial philosophy as well as hinge their vote on whether
they find the nominee's responses satisfactory. Jeremy Rabkin's treatment of the
34.
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White House Counsel is far more mystifying, because it is the tale of an office
without statutory authorization that rarely produces a paper record of its
handiwork and invokes attorney-client privilege to keep secretive the precise
contours of its operations. 39 With that said, fingerprints are occasionally left
and Rabkin demonstrates both the influence of this office and the reality that if
the president "wants to play an effective role in the evolution of constitutional
law, he will need to have a sizable and capable White House Counsel's
Specifically, since post-Watergate presidents have been pressured to
Office."'
treat the Justice Department as a safe harbor for independent professionalism,
the White House Counsel often serves as the president's chief lawyer on
politicized constitutional disputes. For example, Clinton White House Counsel
Bernard Nussbaum spearheaded Administration efforts to treat Hillary Clinton
as a government official in order to keep secret the workings of her health care
Structural divisions of responsibility as well as procedural
task force.41
requirements also play a large role in Roger Davidson's treatment of "attributes
of contemporary congressional decisionmaking" that shape Congress's role as
constitutional interpreter.4 2 Davidson's analysis points to the critical role played
by procedural rules governing multiple referrals and overlapping jurisdiction
between policymaking authorizations committees and appropriations committees
that control funding. Davidson also calls attention to the varied practices
between the lawyer-driven Judiciary Committee and policy-driven committees
such as Energy and Commerce. Illustrative of the differences between the
Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees is Judiciary's scholarly
cautiousness in its handling of flag burning legislation and Energy and
Commerce's ramshod handling of dial-a-porn legislation.4 3 Combusting with the
structural and procedural variables are Congress's "tendency to obfuscate and
compromise" as well as issues of congressional leadership and whether the White
House and Congress are controlled by the same political party. This mix of
factors and circumstances makes clear why "Congress rarely speaks with a single,
clear, unambiguous voice."'
Court Attitudes Toward Elected Branch Interpretation. The willingness (or
unwillingness) of the judiciary to defer to elected branch interpretations figures
prominently in several of the articles. Peter Shane's contribution on voting rights
acknowledges the large role that the Supreme Court plays in the development
of "our statutory constitution" through its recognition of sweeping congressional
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5 John McGinnis also sees
the courts as sometimes facilitating the exercise of power by the elected
branches. McGinnis, for example, argues that the courts keep out of foreign
39. See generally Rabkin, supra note 33.
40. Id. at 98.
41. Id. at 63.
42. Roger H. Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (Autumn 1993).
43. Id at 113.
44. Id at 118.
45. See generally Shane, supra note 27.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 56: No. 4

affairs as part of an implicit bargain where each branch controls spheres of
authority that match its institutional needs.'
Louis Fisher's study of the
legislative veto, in contrast, sees the courts playing an obstructionist role.
Noting that "the Court [in Chadha] attempt[ed] too broad a remedy and fail[ed]
to recognize the practical needs that led Congress and the executive branch to
adopt the legislative veto in the first place,"'47 Fisher finds it only fitting that
"pragmatic agreements hammered out between the elected branches" play a
more prominent role in this area than do constitutional doctrines announced by
the Supreme Court.'
The most sweeping investigations of the nexus between elected government
action and judicial doctrine are those of Stephen Wermiel and Robert Nagel.
Wermiel concludes in his study of the "post-Bork era of Supreme Court
nominations" that "members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have learned to
shape the constitutional dialogue in confirmation hearings to make clear to
nominees that a willingness to profess belief in some threshold constitutional
values is prerequisite for the job."49 For Wermiel, the saliency of this post-Bork

model is vividly illustrated by the Court's reaffirmation of both abortion rights
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and church-state separation in Lee v.
Weisman.50 In contrast to Wermiel's study of elected branch efforts to influence
jurists before they decide a case, Robert Nagel examines what weight-if
51
any-courts should give to elected government resistance to court decisions.
Recognizing that "the use of state and local laws to help define our constitutional
traditions is fully consistent with the constitutional structure,"52 Nagel sets out
to understand whether there is some principle that explains why courts should
not consider local resistance when deliberating on constitutional questions.
Arguments rooted in the belief that courts should articulate enduring neutral
principles and that adjudication should resolve disputes and not spur on
continuing uncertainty, for Nagel, are unsatisfactory. For example, judicial
efforts to stymie legislative opposition to Roe-by expanding abortion rights in
the decade after Roe-undercut both stability and respect for the rule of law by
"[making] the effective meaning
of the right to privacy even more unacceptable
53
to segments of the public.
Power SharingAmong the Branches. Descriptions of power sharing among
the branches play a large role in many of the contributions. Peter Shane's
explication of a "statutory constitution" is very much an account of how
Congress and the courts work in tandem in the creation and validation of

46.
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48.
49.
50.
51.
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52.
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statutory-based constitutional rights.' Kathy Abrams's examination of military
androcentrism likewise calls for the courts and Congress to work together by
filling in the gaps left by the other."5 Louis Fisher's accounting of how the
Court's legislative veto decision was effectively nullified by overwhelming
political forces calls attention to a much different type of power sharing between
the elected branches and the courts. 6 My case study on FCC-legislative-judicial
relations calls attention to an intricate dance in which the FCC sought to advance
its deregulatory agenda in the face of a hostile Congress by attempting to
manipulate unmanipulable D.C. Circuit judges.57
Two of the contributions provide normative models from which to understand
the power sharing issue. John McGinnis argues in his piece on foreign affairs
that "the power of constitutional interpretation, the fundamental authority in a
constitutional republic, is not indivisible nor immovable, but may be disaggregated and so as to allot a portion to the branch that will gain the most utility from
its exercise."58 For McGinnis, executive control of war-making simply reflects
the reality that this subject is much more central to the executive than to the
judiciary or Congress. In contrast, the subject of individual rights is more central
to the judiciary and the power of the purse is more central to the Congress.
Geoffrey Miller also serves up a normative model of power sharing through his
"unified theory" of the president's power of constitutional interpretation. 9 To
start, Miller rejects the executive supremacy argument, noting that "complete
executive autonomy would so seriously undermine the authority of the federal
judiciary as an autonomous branch of government as to threaten the basic
premises of the separation of powers." 6 Miller, instead, proposes a unified
theory which incorporates considerations such as energy in government, factionavoidance, liberty, and checks and balances. Unlike the executive autonomy
model, Miller's unified theory is sensitive to the effect of binding court decisions,
which may only be disobeyed "in extraordinary circumstances when the integrity
of the nation is threatened, 6' as well as the principle of liberty which "suggests
that the president should be constrained to favor interpretations that protect
individual liberties."'62 Miller also advocates that the president should defer to
settled judicial precedent and keep to a minimum his review of existing
legislation. Unlike McGinnis who supports expansive presidential authority in
areas critically important to the White House, Miller's unified theory, rather than
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being tied to spheres of authority, places general limits on presidential
constitutional interpretation.

The growing academic recognition of elected branch constitutional
interpretation is well deserved. The articles contained in this symposium leave
no doubt that constitutional decisionmaking is a dynamic process involving both
elected government and the courts. Contributions on institutional actors suggest
that every committee, subcommittee, department, agency, and office within
government is involved in resolving constitutional disputes. Case studies likewise
reveal the significance and perhaps dominance of elected branch constitutional
interpretation. Although the case studies are far from a representational crosssection of government action, the pervasiveness of elected branch interpretation
in each of these studies makes clear that political action is an indispensable
feature of constitutional decisionmaking.
Whatever conclusions one reaches about the constitutional dialogues that
take place between elected governments and the courts, the centrality of this
dynamic process cannot be discounted. By considering a broad spectrum of
institutional actors and case studies, it is hoped that this symposium will prove
a useful tool in studying the political dynamics of constitutional law.

